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After Interventionism: A Typology of United States Strategies
John MacMillan
Department of Politics and History, Brunel University, Uxbridge, Middlesex, UK
ABSTRACT
What strategies does the United States pursue when it no
longer perceives overt military intervention as politically viable
or desirable but the problems or issues for which it was for-
merly undertaken remain? This analysis identifies three such
periods in American foreign policy since the United States
became a World Power and draws from the work of Peter
Hall to develop a typology of strategies according to the
magnitude of policy change. These range from adjustment in
the settings of interventionism – persistence; the substitution
of alternative instruments of foreign policy – ameliorism; and
the principled rejection of interventionism in conjunction with
a more systematic critique of prevailing foreign policy assump-
tions – transformationalism. Yet each approach is beset by
certain structural limits and contradictions arising from the
domestic politics and constitutional-institutional system of
the United States that are important in understandiing and
appreciating more fully the challenges – and opportunities –
of the period ‘after interventionism’.
Investigating the complexities and nuances of policy ideas is thus expected to
provide us with a window into our society, how it seeks to solve problems and
how the solutions it generates often have unforeseen consequences … .
Hogan and Howlett, 20151
And, by God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all.
George H.W. Bush, 19912
Long regarded as a fundamental instrument of Great Power statecraft,3
intervention is a means of projecting power and influence and, importantly,
performing ‘Great Powerness’ through demonstrating vigour on the global
stage. Yet, as Peter Hall has emphasised, states not only ‘power’, they also
‘puzzle’.4 In this regard, intervention has a practical or functional policy
utility in addressing a range of foreign policy problems or ‘puzzles’. These
two facets, however – power performative and problem solver – are often in
a state of contradiction.
After the Cold War, the United States, Britain, and France in particular
amongst the democracies undertook military intervention to achieve intrinsically
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difficult, higher order goals including humanitarian relief, nation-building, demo-
cratic regime change, and advancing human rights. Following 9/11, the focus of
interventions became more directly security centric, but in the quest for political
stability these, too, were unable to escape from the tasks of state- and nation-
building. Yet the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan in particular had
a devastating impact on the support base and political viability of intervention
such that for many – but by no means all – politicians, it became a toxic issue.5 In
September 2014, for example, President Barack Obama stressed the point that
whilst authorising targeted strikes against the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant
[ISIL], he would not commit ‘our Armed Forces to fighting another groundwar in
Iraq’.6 In so doing publicly, he overruled the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Martin Dempsey, who had earlier suggested otherwise. A year earlier,
plans to seek authorisation from Congress for air strikes over Syria, with no
immediate risk of large-scale casualties, were withdrawn following the defeat of
a parallel proposal in the British Parliament. In truth, however, by the end of the
1990s the limits and weaknesses of intervention were already well-exposed, lead-
ing the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty to
rethink the practice in the form of the – to date ineffectual – 2001 doctrine of
the ‘Responsibility to Protect’.7
This ‘crisis of interventionism’ is conceptual, political, and strategic and
presents a hitherto neglected question. What approaches or strategies are
available to democracies when the problems triggering intervention persist
but the type of interventions hitherto undertaken become politically unvi-
able, ethically undesirable, or perceived as functionally ineffective? To clarify,
this analysis concerns the overt ‘boots on the ground’ type of intervention
Table 1. A typology of the strategies pursued by U.S. administrations follow-
ing a ‘crisis of interventionism’.
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that have been such a prominent feature of United States foreign policy in
recent years. Interventions do of course come in many forms but, for this
very reason, analyses that recognise the distinct political characteristics and
syndromes of the various types is important. The focus here, then, is on
intervention defined as ‘direct combatant or combat-preparatory military
operations conducted on foreign territory by units of a state’s regular military
forces’.8 It is in these large-scale ‘boots on the ground’ operations that the
crisis of interventionism is most pronounced, but its effects may ripple out to
other forms of intervention, too. The term ‘interventionism’ is used here to
emphasise the systematic nature of intervention for the United States – and
some but not all of its allies; these are not a series of one-off episodes but
reflect the political-cultural inclination towards intervention as an appropri-
ate and/or desirable means through which to address a range of international
problems.
Often overlooked is that the present ‘crisis of interventionism’ is neither
a novel phenomenon nor solely part of the extended legacy of the Vietnam
War; it is in fact the third such crisis faced by America since becoming
a World Power at the turn of the twentieth century. Whilst that of the 1970s
and 1980s following the Vietnam War remains well known, that of the 1920s
and 1930s, in which American interventionism in Latin America became
increasingly controversial and politically costly, rarely features in analyses of
the politics of interventionism. Yet identifying three rather than two such
crises allows an examination of the influence of structural factors, specifically
those arising from the domestic constitutional-institutional structure and
enduring – but contested – American political-philosophical values.
Analysing the three crises, comprising eight administrations, reveals three
broad types of strategic approach or ‘answer’ to the question posed above
according to the degree of change they embody. In the context of the
American political system, however, powerful political factors limit the
possibility of maintaining any of the strategies, let alone allowing them to
become fully developed. This is a function of the domestic ideological,
partisan, and/or political divisions within the United States that are able to
influence the political and policy process through the multiple leverage
points afforded by its constitutional-institutional system.
The typology itself draws upon Hall’s seminal analysis of British economic
policy-making in the 1970s with three identified orders of change: the
settings – or levels/calibration – of existing policy instruments; policy instru-
ments themselves; or overarching policy goals.9 When applied to questions of
the ‘use of force’ following a crisis of interventionism, they are manifest in
the strategies of ‘persistence’, ‘ameliorism’, and ‘transformationalism’,
respectively.
‘First order’ change as applied by Hall to domestic economic policy-
making referred to adjustments in the ‘settings’ or calibration of the existing
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instruments of policy, such as the minimum lending rate, whilst the basic
hierarchy of assumptions and goals remained the same. This corresponds to
the strategy of ‘persistence’ in which leaders continue to put militarised
interventionism in the foreground but are likely to modify the specific
form it takes in the hope of adjusting to the changed political environment.
Even when policy-makers do seek to re-conceptualise the wider bases of
foreign policy, such as Richard Nixon’s turn to détente10 or Ronald Reagan’s
militant anti-communist liberalism, persistence with military means triggers
significant domestic political counter-pressures that are consequential both
domestically and in foreign policy. Hall marked the ‘second order’ change by
a shift in the instruments of policy yet largely within the same hierarchy of
goals, such as introducing a new system of monetary control in 1971. This
corresponds to ‘ameliorism’ in which leaders retreat from the use of force
and seek alternative instruments of policy, typically diplomacy, whilst tend-
ing to operate within existing frameworks and assumptions regarding foreign
policy and the bases of international order. A ‘paradigm shift’ distinguished
Hall’s ‘third order’ change, entailing change in ‘all three components of
policy: the instrument settings, the instruments themselves, and the hierarchy
of goals behind policy’.11 For Hall, this was evident in the shift from
Keynesianism to monetarism; and it corresponds here to ‘transformational-
ism’ in which the use of force becomes stigmatised as part of a more
systematic reconceptualisation of foreign policy – encompassing the ethical
bases of American foreign policy and of regional/international order.
Hall synthesised Hugh Heclo’s observation that states are puzzle – or
problem – solvers as well as power-seekers and Thomas Kuhn’s distinction
between normal and revolutionary science. This difference underpinned
Kuhn’s notion of paradigms, ‘a cognitive model shared by a particular com-
munity of actors, and which facilitates problem solving’,12 and expressed the
possibility of a fundamental conceptual – or paradigm – shift in how social
questions are understood and addressed.13 For Kuhn, whereas both first
and second order change marked instances of ‘normal science’, the third
order was ‘revolutionary’. Hall emphasised the role of ideas and social
learning in the development of policy, seeking to highlight the relationship
between the nature and breadth of the policy community involved in the
policy-process and the scale of emerging policy change.14 Hence, policy
learning undertaken solely by bureaucracies and technocrats is likely to
remain limited whereas more extensive and especially revolutionary change
is likely to require greater input from politicians and civil society.
Applying Hall’s framework for understanding change at the domestic level
to the international realm does require, however, qualification. All of the
strategies discussed below in fact represent ‘bounded puzzling’ in that none
was free from considerations of geopolitical and geo-economic risk and
contingency as perceived by policy-making elites. Except for the subtle
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point that the disavowal of the use of force in foreign policy is itself
a revolutionary act, the transformationalists are as well if not better regarded
as ‘radicals’ rather than ‘revolutionaries’, in-keeping with their awareness of
the problems structural power presents for superseding interventionism. Yet
by way of perspective, Hall’s account of the shift from Keynesianism to
monetarism is not a truly ‘revolutionary’ occurrence; it was a shift in the
episteme governing the organisation of capitalism, not the supersession of
capitalism itself.
Since the late nineteenth century, there have been three especially inter-
ventionist periods in American foreign relations, characterised by particu-
larly high levels of political and cultural mobilisation for intervention in
support of ambitious political agendas. Each ended in disillusionment. The
interventionism of the ‘Progressive age’ from the late 1890s through to the
1910s,15 spanning the administrations of William McKinley, Theodore
Roosevelt, William Taft, and Woodrow Wilson gave way to widespread
disaffection in the 1920s and 1930s. In the Cold War, the doctrine of
‘containment’ presented a standing rationale for interventionism, particularly
in the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson years, yet became unsustainable
after the experience of Vietnam. Likewise, the interventionism of the post-
Cold War period in the administrations of G.H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and G.
W. Bush collapsed in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan, even if the political
and policy fissures were already evident in the 1990s.
Consequently, a major challenge faced those in office after the tide turned
against interventionism: Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover,
and Franklin Roosevelt in the 1920s through to the mid-1940s; Nixon, Gerald
Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Reagan from the late 1960s to the late-1980s; and
Obama from 2009–2017. The challenge was to navigate American foreign
policy without the ready ability – or in some cases the wish – of deploying
ground troops abroad. These administrations faced a similar set of political
and social pressures: ideological divisions, opposition in Congress, a public
no longer willing to bear the costs of interventionism, and a critical media.
Many also faced adverse economic conditions. Yet as represented in Table
One and discussed below, responses can be classified into three main types.
A strategy of ‘persistence’ refers to the behaviour of political leaders
who find themselves facing high levels of political opposition and institu-
tional constraints concerning the use of force but seek to override or
circumvent these to maintain a militarised approach. When faced with
a political and societal turn against interventionism, Coolidge simply
persisted in sending the marines, yet both the Nixon/Ford and Reagan
administrations developed more sophisticated strategies of persistence by
mixing covert actions and military ‘sub-contracting’, but in both cases led
the administrations to act illegally and actively subvert constitutional and
institutional constraints. A strategy of ‘persistence’ generates strong
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domestic political pressures that have at times prevented, constrained, or
terminated interventions and displayed to allies and adversaries alike the
difficulties of projecting power and providing security guarantees in the
face of domestic political opposition. Furthermore, during the Coolidge
and Nixon/Ford periods in particular, efforts to persist with intervention-
ism generated more radical critiques and accelerated the rise of alternative
political approaches that informed the transformationalist policies of
Roosevelt and Carter, but which were already being articulated and devel-
oped within Congress, bureaucracies, and civil society. As the cases of
Coolidge, Nixon/Ford, and Reagan show, a strategy of persistence is
unlikely to be sustainable and prone to energise or even strengthen the
very constraints it seeks to circumvent.
For Coolidge (1923–1929) and his secretary of State, Charles Hughes, the
1917 Bolshevik revolution and rise of revolutionary nationalism in the
American hemisphere fused into one transcendental threat.16 In April 1925,
Hughes’ successor, Frank Kellogg, used his first foreign policy speech to hint
at the prospect of intervention in Mexico in the face of rumoured Bolshevik
influence. As the Administration’s representative at the 1928 Conference of
American States in Havana, Hughes blocked an anti-intervention resolution
and delivered the period’s last high profile defence of the United States’ right
to intervene in Latin America.17 The issue was highly emotive. Not only was
an intervention in Haiti continuing, but delegates also bristled at the re-
occupation of Nicaragua in 1927 with the return of 5,000 marines and 11
cruisers and destroyers that lasted until 1933.
The Coolidge-Kellogg years marked the lowest point in United States-
Latin American relations in the inter-war years,18 yet it was also a period of
attitudinal change and political counter-mobilisation in American politics
that pointed towards the transformationalist approach of the 1930s.
Republican business internationalists were not the only group now question-
ing the interventionist turn; so, too, were the progressives in the tradition of
William J. Bryan, who had earlier been receptive to calls for intervention on
humanitarian or ‘civilisational’ grounds but increasingly came to see that this
could readily degenerate into imperialism in the service of ‘money power’.19
The progressives were important both for a series of specific anti-
interventionist achievements and shifting perceptions of interventionism
such that ‘policies that professional-managerial elites had once seen as
apolitical and stabilizing now churned in the vortex of political
controversy’.20 Indeed, by 1929, the ‘peace progressives’ had established
themselves as the ‘most important congressional players on issues relating
to the underdeveloped world, a bloc that policy-makers could afford to
ignore only at their peril’.21
Specific achievements in this period included the passage of the Ladd
Resolution in February 1925, which sought to end the practice of
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military guarantees for loans and raised the profile of the anti-
imperialism cause more widely.22 Against this shifting intellectual and
political background, Coolidge Administration ‘Red Scare’ tactics and
threats of intervention in Mexico resoundingly backfired as efforts to
manipulate the press and sully the reputation of critics saw a flush of
negative news editorials and, in January 1927, the unanimous passing of
the Robinson Resolution in Congress recommending a diplomatic solu-
tion to the Mexican crisis.23 When faced with Coolidge’s intervention in
Nicaragua in 1927, peace progressives compensated for their limited
strength in the Senate by seeking to exploit the pluralist institutional
framework by using a series of Congressional hearings to publicise
controversial information about the intervention to arouse public opi-
nion such that Democrat and moderate Republican senators would
oppose the Administration. The subsequent Dill Amendment of 1929
‘marked the first occasion in American history on which a branch of
congress had cut off funding for an overseas military conflict still in
progress’, even if subsequently the Administration cajoled legislators into
reversing the decision.24
Besides this high level of Congressional opposition, the strategy of persistence
forced a turning point within the foreign policy bureaucracy. In one view:
… with some backsliding and some dissent, officials in Washington found themselves
unable to escape the conviction that their employment of force in the Caribbean was
not only disproportionately expensive in protecting citizens and property abroad and
ineffective in promoting democracy; it was also positively disadvantageous to their
evolving conception of the national interest of the United States.25
Coupled with years of frustration within the State Department at the level of
queries and criticism arising from the lack of clarity in American policy, the
Nicaragua intervention led to internal circulation of the 1928 Clark memor-
andum that repudiated the claim that intervention was permissible under the
‘Roosevelt Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine.26 Indeed, 1928 was also
the year in which Franklin Roosevelt published a Foreign Affairs article
acknowledging his role in earlier Caribbean interventions. He now called
for a new spirit of international relations based ‘not only [on] certain facts
but many new principles of a higher law’, not least recognising the moral
claims of the other American republics and renouncing arbitrary United
States intervention.27 Persistence with interventionism under Coolidge had
sharpened criticism to the point that by the 1930s, American officials,
intellectuals, and the informed public increasingly reckoned not only that
Washington ‘could’ not impose cultural change in Latin America, but also
that it ‘should’ not.28
Nixon (1969–1974) was cognisant of the changed political environment
for interventionism prior to his election and subsequently adapted the use
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of military force in the hope of circumventing and disarming public
opinion and institutional constraints. Yet his persistence in the use of
force abroad, in conjunction with the Watergate scandal at home, led to
greater Congressional resistance and contributed to an environment in
which Carter’s transformationalism could rise to prominence. In a 1967
Foreign Affairs article, Nixon recognised that Vietnam would forge
a legacy of ‘deep reluctance on the part of the United States to become
involved once again in a similar intervention on a similar basis’.29 His
alternative, espoused in the ‘Nixon Doctrine’, was an extension of his
‘Vietnamisation’ approach to the war itself, whereby allies in the periphery
would now take responsibility for the maintenance of their own security –
precisely to avoid the direct commitment of American forces – but with
Washington offering support and resources. Yet the Nixon Doctrine was
part of a bigger design, a ‘new structure of peace’, whereby relations with
Moscow would be enveloped in a dynamic package linking competition
and co-operation, and carrying sufficient incentives and leverage to
restrain the Soviets from fomenting crises on the periphery. In this
schema, the United States would support its regional allies in their role
of proactively preventing the emergence of potentially destabilising local
power vacuums.30
It was a creative, conceptually ambitious approach to declining United
States geopolitical primacy and the crisis of post-Vietnam interventionism,
going beyond a simple adaptation or recalibration of interventionism, but
which maintained the centrality of interventionism and the use of force.
Nevertheless these efforts to re-formulate an intervention system31 in the
face of a crisis of interventionism through the requirement for greater execu-
tive latitude, secrecy, and continued militarisation of foreign policy in fact led
Congress to re-assert its authority over foreign affairs and constrain the
Administration’s use of force. Nixon’s secret bombing of Cambodia in
March 1969 exacerbated mistrust, and the public outcry following the land
invasion of Cambodia a year later, involving American and South Vietnamese
troops, led Congress to pass the Cooper-Church amendment intended to
prevent unauthorised funding for United States military operations in
Cambodia after 1 July 1970.32 That Nixon’s Administration delayed, diluted,
and subsequently defied Cooper-Church and a further revised amendment by
intensifying the bombing led Congress to pass, against a presidential veto, the
1973 War Powers Act stopping American combat participation in Indochina
and restricting presidential powers to commit forces abroad.
Ford (1974–1977) strongly supported by Henry Kissinger, both his and
Nixon’s secretary of state, sought to make a robust demonstration of
Washington’s enduring resolve and capacity to use force after the fall of
Saigon when, in May 1975, Cambodian forces captured the American
merchant ship, SS Mayaguez, and its 39 crew-members. However, the
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Administration was unable to shake-off Congressional constraints, parti-
cularly following the election of the ‘Watergate babies’ – new Democrat
legislators – in the 1974 mid-term voting. A series of revelations, including
the Central Intelligence Agency’s covert destabilisation of an elected gov-
ernment in Chile, collusion with the Mafia to assassinate a foreign head of
state, and domestic spying on 10,000 citizens, saw the Hughes-Ryan
amendment imposing greater Congressional oversight of the American
intelligence agencies.33 Moreover, the Case-Church amendment cut further
funding for American military operations in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia
in the face of intense opposition from Nixon and Kissinger. In Angola’s
case, Ford and Kissinger authorised secret assistance to two factions and
regarded such activity a vital demonstration of resolve to allies and foes
alike, only for Congress to cut funding through the Clark-Tunney
amendments.34
Nixon and Ford’s strategy of persistence carried a high price for presidential
authority as Congress denied Kissinger the ‘indispensable flexibility’ he
required to maintain an interventionist foreign policy amidst anti-
interventionist sentiment.35 The rupture between the executive and legislative
branches also had medium-term consequences: Congress pursued a more
radical ‘new internationalist’ vision of American foreign relations emphasising
demilitarisation, human rights, support for democracy, economic co-
operation, and cultural exchange.36 These would feature prominently follow-
ing Carter’s election in 1976. However, as the case of Reagan (1981–1989)
shows, whilst persistence is highly likely to be controversial, it does not
necessarily lead to enhanced legal checks on the office of the president or
a transformationalist successor.
The Reagan Administration’s strong anti-communism focused on reversing
the perceived expansion of Soviet power during the 1970s: Vietnam had been
a ‘noble enterprise’; ‘Reaganomics’ would revitalise the economy; and the
conflict with the Soviet Union, the ‘evil empire’, a ‘crusade for freedom’.37
The bid for strategic primacy over the Soviets included plans for militarising
space and new offensive nuclear weapons systems in Europe – matched with
proposals for disarmament – and in the periphery found expression in the
‘Reagan Doctrine’. The Doctrine was ‘politically sensitive to post-Vietnam
political realities’ given difficulty in deploying ground troops,38 but concur-
rently drew upon earlier Republican notions of ‘rollback’ by supporting anti-
communist proxy forces in reversing socialist and communist gains in the
periphery. Levels of Congressional and public support for the Reagan Doctrine
varied according to the perceived level of legitimacy of specific campaigns.
At the same time, the question of direct military intervention remained
sensitive and vexing. Service personnel were swiftly withdrawn following the
deaths of 241 Americans from a suicide bombing in Lebanon in 1983, where
they served as part of a multinational ‘peacekeeping’ operation. Nevertheless,
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two days later, American forces invaded Grenada to depose a left-wing regime
in an operation that conformed to the archetypal domestic political require-
ments of a ‘successful’ intervention: swiftly executed with minimal American
casualties. In November 1984, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger sought
to codify a set of circumscribed conditions for the commitment of troops
abroad, which included the need for a ‘reasonable assurance’ of Congressional
and public support, clearly defined objectives, and undertaken only as a last
resort, ‘wholeheartedly’, on matters of vital national interests. They have been
as controversial as they are superficially clear.39
With regard to the Reagan Doctrine, support for mujahedeen resistance in
Afghanistan appeared to be its most successful campaign until the ‘blowback’
of al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks.40 That the Soviet Union had directly invaded
Afghanistan, therein contravening liberal and international norms, led to
broad support within Congress for a qualitative expansion of the assistance
to local forces initiated by Carter. By contrast, that intervention concerning
Sandinista Nicaragua was controversial from the outset reflects the distinction
drawn in the theoretical literature between the perceived legitimacy amongst
the American public for interventions undertaken to reverse a perceived act of
aggression as against the illegitimacy of coercively interfering in other peoples’
civil conflicts.41 The secrecy with which the Administration conducted the
mission, the ambivalence of the objectives, and the question of whether force
was or was not being used in conjunction with a diplomatic track exacerbated
the contentious domestic legitimacy of involvement and produced a breach of
trust between the Administration and Congress.
Predictably, the Administration faced greater resistance from the Democrat-
controlled House than the Republican-controlled Senate, with key measures
including the Boland amendments and Intelligence Authorization Act that
curtailed funding for lethal – and latterly all – support for the anti-Sandinista
Contra forces. Yet the Administration was determined and returned repeatedly
for funding, finding particular success following Reagan’s 1984 landslide re-
election, giving him strength to pressure Republican Congressional opponents
to support the Administration’s budgetary requests. Nonetheless, the
Administration’s unwillingness to accept Congressional constraints led it to
pursue a secret parallel foreign policy undertaken by its own National Security
staff. This entailed soliciting private donations from American citizens and
foreign governments, the mining of Nicaraguan harbours, and channelling
revenue from the clandestine sale of arms to Iran to fund Contra operations.
When exposed, Congress withdrew all funding for the Contras in 1987 and
prohibited further support. As American backing for the Contras ebbed, the
Contadora peace process,42 a regional initiative, progressed faster and, under
Reagan’s successor, George H.W. Bush, gained bipartisan American support for
the ensuing peace deal. Yet despite such a spectacular abuse of executive power,
Reagan escaped impeachment and Congress did not seek to pass further
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legislation curtailing executive power, as it had done after Vietnam. A number of
case specific factors combined to forestall such an eventuality. These included
Reagan’s tactical handling of the episode, co-operation with the Tower
Commission examining the Iran-Contra affair, the lack of evidence that
Reagan knew of Iran-Contra, Congress’ ambivalent role in Contra-funding,
the political sensitivity of another impeachment scandal so soon after Nixon,
and the wider thaw in Cold War relations suggesting that anti-communist
interventionism might wither of its own accord.43
Following a crisis of interventionism, a strategy of persistence has always
been controversial. They have provoked the other institutions of government
to try to counter continuing interventionism and can stir societal and
political pressures for a more radical, principled turn from the ‘intervention
system’. Persistence tends to require administrations to break the bonds of
trust with the legislature, exacerbate societal and political divisions, and
subvert due process and legal constraints. It undermines the very moral
authority that democracies claim distinguishes them amongst states. These
characteristics render it unsustainable as a strategy, short of corroding
democratic institutions and process.
Strategies of ameliorism proceed in accordance with the changed political
climate and tend toward drawing down or withdrawing from existing inter-
ventions, substituting alternative instruments of foreign policy, typically
diplomacy, whilst operating within prevailing sets of assumptions about
foreign policy goals and hierarchies and the wider conditions of international
order. Ameliorists may or may not desire deeper change in United States
foreign policy, but through necessity or choice, their approach tends to be
pragmatic and evolutionary as distinct from generating a grand new con-
ceptual and political vision as with the case of the transformationalists. The
question for ameliorists is whether this type of approach, which tends not to
address the underlying structural conditions of hierarchy and inequality
amongst states that reproduce tensions in foreign relations, will be sufficient
to withstand criticism from the proponents of more radical strategies on
either flank. The experience of Harding, Hoover, and Obama is instructive.
During the 1920 election campaign, Harding (1921–1923) seized upon the
American public’s weariness of war and interventionism. Pointing to
Franklin Roosevelt’s boastfulness regarding his role in drafting Haiti’s con-
stitution, Harding promised that if elected, he would not ‘jam [a constitu-
tion] down their throats at the point of bayonets’ nor ‘misuse the power of
the Executive to cover with a veil of secrecy repeated acts of unwarranted
interference … . [making] enemies of those who should be our friends’.44
The business internationalists associated with the Republican Party did not
only object to the moralising interventionism of the Wilson years. They also
reckoned that repeated interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean
had not only failed to deliver the financial returns promised by the
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imperialists in the 1890s and 1900s but had fuelled widespread and counter-
productive anti-Yankee sentiment. Central to the rise of political nationalism
in Mexico, for example, were grievances over foreign ownership of resources
and property rights. Accordingly, whilst Harding remained committed to
promoting American financial and commercial interests, he substituted
a more conciliatory diplomacy and persuasion for the interventionism and
‘aggressive altruism’ of the Wilson years.45
During his two-and-a-half year term, Harding took several notable steps to
improve hemispheric relations, including the initiation of troop withdrawal
from the Dominican Republic, mediation efforts in Central America, resolu-
tion of the Isle of Pines dispute, and unsuccessful efforts to arbitrate the
Tacna-Arica Question between Peru and Chile. In addition, he avoided
intervention in Cuba and used the Republican majority to break
Congressional deadlock on a number of dormant treaty issues. Yet under-
pinning all was the continued possibility of menace. The Administration
proved unwilling to draw a clear line under the interventionism that had
characterised recent relations and, whilst there was no question that Harding
sought to avoid full-scale military intervention, ‘perceived that it could
substitute diplomatic persuasion for military coercion only so long as the
potential threat of the latter remained’.46 This unwillingness to reject inter-
ventionism limited the prospects for improvement in relations and, under
Coolidge, the threat materialised with the major intervention in Nicaragua
discussed earlier.
Still, running parallel to the Republican business internationalists’ critique
was that of the ‘peace progressives’, who consolidated as a group in opposition
to what they regarded as Wilson’s imperial turn. Specific achievements in this
period include successfully blocking a controlled loan to Liberia, denying the
budget for maintaining marines in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and
maintaining a spotlight on Haiti that would otherwise likely have faded in the
wake of Senator Joseph Medill McCormick committee’s recommendations for
only minor changes to the occupation.47 They also developed innovative
modes of political organisation forging a series of national and transnational
networks under the banner of ‘anti-imperialism’with such diverse actors as the
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, the National
Association for the Advancement of Coloured Peoples, and the presidents of
the Dominican Republic and Haiti. Domestically, criticism was channelled
through such media as The Nation and newly popular radio broadcasts and
internationally through such fora as the Paris Peace Conference and a series of
Pan-African Congresses.48 Such opposition prevented Harding from isolating
the politics of post-interventionism through a strategy of conservative ameli-
orism with its undercurrent seeking to restore rather than redress the imperial
nature of United States-Latin American relations.
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During his 1928 tour of Latin America when president-elect, Hoover
(1929–1933) repeatedly used the term ‘good neighbor’ and signalled to his
hosts the intention of setting the relationship on a new footing. Critical of
previous interventions, he stated in April 1929 that it ‘ought not to be the
policy of the United States to intervene by force to secure or maintain
contracts between our citizens and foreign states or their citizens’.49 This
circumscribed disavowal of interventionism was re-enforced in 1930 by
publication of the Clark memorandum, which Coolidge had hitherto sup-
pressed. Troops gradually withdrew from Nicaragua – except about 100
marines to train the National Guard and protect United States interests –
and Hoover set in train the withdrawal of forces, if not authority over the
customs house, from Haiti. One upshot of renouncing intervention and
removing the American military was that Washington, now better posi-
tioned, could act as a peace broker; in this vein, Hoover took particular
pride in succeeding where his predecessors had failed in finding a settlement
to the Tacna-Arica dispute.50
Whereas Harding’s ameliorism was pragmatic, even opportunistic,
Hoover’s was philosophical in kind: grounded in his Quaker pacifist roots
but also running a rich vein of Manchester liberalism.51 The ‘basic reason
behind Hoover’s refusal to sanction the use of force in revolutionary situa-
tions in Latin America or during the Manchurian crisis of 1931–32 was his
belief that no economic world community under American leadership could
be permanently established through such means’.52 More so than Harding,
Hoover’s philosophical ameliorism establishes the integrity of the ameliorist
approach in its own right, whilst also confirming its limits.
Given Harding’s refusal to rule out the use of intervention and Coolidge’s
reversion to it, Hoover’s problem was one of trust and credibility, which
despite a de facto policy of non-intervention he never fully shook off either in
the minds of Latin and domestic contemporaries or subsequent evaluation of
his policies by historians.53 For this, more positive post-intervention politics
was required. Whereas Hoover offered a circumscribed spoken pledge of
non-intervention, Franklin Roosevelt made this a general treaty commit-
ment. Whilst Hoover left the impression of indifference through presiding
over the collapse of intra-hemispheric trading relations and signing the
infamous Smoot-Hawley tariff, Roosevelt sought to extend the political and
institutional innovations of his New Deal to Latin America even if domestic
political opposition thwarted it.
To turn to Obama, an electoral rhetoric of ‘change’ and desire to ‘trans-
form how we think about ourselves as a country in fundamental ways’ belied
what was an ameliorist rather than a transformationalist foreign policy
strategy.54 The comment that Obama was a ‘progressive pragmatist’, who
saw his task ‘not to seek transformational change abroad but to “bend
[history’s arc] in the direction of justice”’, could also be applied to his
588 J. MACMILLAN
approach to the use of force in foreign affairs in the wake of the Iraq and
Afghanistan wars.55 For Obama, an ameliorist strategy enabled him to focus
on his domestic political priorities, including the economic bailout following
the 2008 crash, healthcare, education, energy, and climate change.56
Questions of the use of force were brought within the framework of ‘just
war’ doctrine, whilst also seeking retrenchment where possible. The signifi-
cance of the ‘just war’ framework, emphasised by Obama in his 2009 Nobel
speech, is to harness the use of force to an external moral standard beyond
that of the interest of the state or the fiat of the president and which he
cannot therefore claim ownership over but rather can be evaluated against
and held to account.57
The desire to avoid being pulled into fresh interventions reflected his
diplomatic efforts to establish a more stable, institutionalised, and self-
regulating security system in the Middle East, part of which was the 2015
nuclear deal with Teheran. This in turn would enable Washington to focus
on the ‘pivot to Asia’ to manage diminished American primacy through
embedding relations in a series of institutional and multilateral relationships,
with the – intended – Trans-Pacific Partnership counter-balancing China’s
‘belt and road’ trade and development initiative.
Obama attuned his ameliorism to the perceived nature and stakes of
respective involvements. Hence, in the case of Iraq, he pursued a phased
withdrawal whilst in Afghanistan and Pakistan a bounded offensive strategy
towards al-Qaeda affiliated groups. In terms of ground forces, this took the
form of an early surge in 2009 of 30,000 troops with a view to withdrawal by
the end of 2014. However, this deadline repeatedly slipped, as there remained
around 10,000 American troops in Afghanistan when he left office – from
over 100,000 in 2011 – with the prospect of them becoming semi-permanent.
Yet, to avoid adverse political reaction and American casualties, Obama
expanded the use of drones and Special Forces, with the latter leading to
the killing of the 9/11 mastermind, Osama bin Laden, in May 2011. Drone
warfare in particular has been controversial due to the incidence of civilian
casualties, the concentration of executive powers, and the longer-term con-
sequences of a mode of warfare that has a light domestic political footprint
but maintains a constant oppressive presence locally.58
Obama’s actions above correspond with the theme of his Nobel speech in
which he argued, ‘there will be times nations – acting individually or in concert –
will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified’.59 Such
circumstances included the use of force ‘to prevent the slaughter of civilians
by their own government, or to stop a civil war whose violence and suffering can
engulf an entire region’.60 It was, however, in these very circumstances that
Obama’s ameliorist approach was most tragically exposed. In 2011, following
United Nations authorisation, the United States embarked upon a limited North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation-led air operation in Libya in the face of a faltering
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insurgency against President Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. Yet after rebel forces
captured and killed Gaddafi, the country descended into a state of disorder and
violence that persists to this day, allowing ISIL to build a presence and generat-
ing large numbers of displaced persons who fled across the region or else were
prepared to take the perilous journey across the Mediterranean to Europe.
Obama has subsequently said that the failure to prepare for the situation post-
Gaddafi was probably the biggest mistake of his presidency and blamed the
British, who in turn blamed the French.61
By contrast, Obama defended his decision not to intervene overtly in Syria
following the alleged use of chemical weapons by President Bashar Hafez al-
Assad’s forces in 2012, an issue upon which he had earlier drawn a ‘red line’.
That Russia’s diplomatic intervention at that juncture marked a turning point
in the balance of Great Power influence has particularly irked critics.62 Yet for
ameliorists, diplomacy is the ace, even when in this case the initiative came
from elsewhere. If diplomacy fails, they tend to be at the mercy of events. In
such circumstances, the remaining ameliorist option would be a generous
humanitarian response, here understood in the ‘classical’ sense of impartial
and non-militarised relief of suffering. Yet as Angela Merkel, the German
chancellor, was to discover with regard to her refugee policy, this too does
not come without controversy or domestic political cost.63
As seen above, a strategy of ameliorism may serve conservative or pro-
gressive agendas; it may be pragmatic or principled or both. Central is the
drawing down or withdrawal from interventionism and a renewed emphasis
on alternative instruments of foreign policy, notably diplomacy, whilst not
fundamentally reformulating the general framework of foreign policy goals
or assumptions. Ameliorists may be nobody’s heroes and may find them-
selves squeezed between the toughs and the visionaries, but the strategy
merits recognition in its own right. The retreat from interventionism can
leave a gap in statecraft: the sense of mission or exalted purpose that the
executive can embody has gone, leaving in its place the risk of foreign policy
perceived as lacking dynamism or falling into a void.64 Whilst a strategy of
persistence might call for a demonstrative reassertion of power, such as
Ford’s use of force over the Mayaguez in 1975 or Reagan’s invasion of
Grenada, the pure ameliorist response would be attainment of public policy
success at home and diplomatic success abroad. But public policy ‘successes’
can be hard to come by, not least in a highly ideological and partisan
domestic political environment where the priorities and goals of public policy
are themselves often contested. Here, ‘transformationalism’ may have an
advantage in generating a fresh vision of foreign policy that can, at least in
principle, excite the imagination and mobilise the energies of a democracy.
Hall’s notion of the third order was characterised by ‘radical changes in the
overarching terms of policy discourse’; where first and second order changes
‘preserve the broad continuities usually found in patterns of policy, third
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order change is often a more disjunctive process associated with periodic
discontinuities in policy’.65 Both Franklin Roosevelt and Carter premised
their post-interventionist politics explicitly on the need to learn from the
mistakes of the past, delegitimised the use of force against weaker nations,
and sought to reformulate relations on the bases of mutual respect and
recognition. However, in both cases, deep-rooted domestic political resis-
tance to the new foreign policies of, respectively, the ‘good neighbor’ and
‘human rights’ blocked efforts at transformational change, reflecting deep-
seated domestic political divisions.
Roosevelt’s (1933–1945) ‘Good Neighbor Policy’ was ‘the most idealist and
successful of the New Deal foreign policies’.66 Its cornerstone was the formal
treaty commitment to non-intervention undertaken initially at the
Montevideo Conference of American States held in December 1933. Article
8 of the ‘Convention on Rights and Duties of States’ reads, ‘No state has the
right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another’. Initially the
United States lodged a reservation regarding existing treaty rights but sub-
sequently dropped it at the 1936 Buenos Aires conference.67 Removing the
standing threat of military force from the equation unlocked a political space
within which a new approach to the underlying problem – revolutionary
nationalism – could emerge as a counter-force to imperialism. The accom-
panying language of recognition and reciprocity, ‘respect[ing] the rights of
others’,68 was more than symbolic and established audience and reputational
costs should Washington break the pledge.
When Bolivia nationalised the property of American oil companies in
1937 and, more significantly, Mexico followed suit in 1938, the marines
stayed away. In the latter case, Washington agreed to settle the issue through
a mixed commission that exposed the ludicrously high property valuations of
the oil companies and went some way to assuage Mexican hostility. More
controversial, however, was Washington’s handling of the Cuban crisis in
summer 1933 that, at best, may be regarded as an early stumble on the path
to non-intervention and, at worst, a repressive interference albeit by non-
military means. Probably, it was both.
The Cuban crisis defined the parameters of Washington’s emerging hege-
mony through ensuring regional states remained within its orbit. After
a period of instability, the Ramón Grau regime, supported by Colonel
Fulgencio Batista, appeared to be re-establishing political order in late 1933.
Yet American officials saw Grau as supported ‘only by the army and ignorant
masses’ rather than the ‘better classes’ of the country,69 and SumnerWelles, the
assistant secretary of State for Latin American Affairs and special envoy to
Cuba, found the new government intolerable, reporting that it was commu-
nistic and threatened the Cuban social order. Roosevelt refusedWelles’ request
for troops but acquiesced in the non-recognition of the Grau regime that in
turn halted renewal of a sugar treaty vital for Cuba’s economic viability. Batista
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took the cue and, after deposing Grau, secured a deal with Washington
whereby respect for American property rights would see the repeal of the
Platt Amendment that maintained a right of American intervention,
a favourable quota system, and reduced tariffs that would return a better
income for the Cubans. The episode, however, did generate unforeseen con-
sequences that defined subsequent policy under Roosevelt. Washington’s
actions were the catalyst for the non-intervention clause at Montevideo, as
the Cuban crisis likely prompted Mexico to initiate the proposal.70
Yet, as Secretary of State Cordell Hull acknowledged in 1935, the renuncia-
tion of interventionism could only be the beginning of the process if a positive
transformation of relations was going to occur.71 When Roosevelt spoke about
giving the Latin Americans ‘a share’, it was not only of the wealth generated
from the region but also ‘decision-making authority in inter-American eco-
nomic concerns’.72 It was here that the New Deal reverberated into Latin
America, with high-level planning, the development of multilateral institu-
tions, and a role for the state. New multilateral trading and financial institu-
tions would, in the words of Adolph Berle, a State Department assistant
secretary, direct capital movements ‘not merely because some concessionaire
wishes to make a profit but following the more careful plans of the various
governments involved with a view to the steady development of the country’.73
The flagship institution was the proposed Inter-American Bank originating in
a Mexican proposal at the 1939 Panama Conference.
Initial Latin American enthusiasm for the project did turn, however, to
disappointment because of failure to facilitate the means through which they
would be able to repay loans, namely an American commitment to purchase
Latin American products, leaving the risk of further indebtedness rather than
development. Within the United States, proponents faced a powerful combi-
nation of private banking interests and Senate opposition to the New Deal
approach to Latin American relations. Specifically, the bankers disliked the
prospect of competition whilst a number of political heavyweights were
hostile: Bernard Baruch, a Roosevelt advisor, suspicious of government
involvement in economic affairs; Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg
protective of Congressional autonomy in the face of rising bureaucratic
power; and another Republican senator, Robert Taft, opposed on grounds
of national interest.74 Despite a nudge from Roosevelt to stop stalling, this
body of interests let the proposal wither in committee chambers. Other
multilateral developments concerning trade and investment either continued
favouring the American private sector or else did not come to fruition, albeit
with the partial exception in 1940 of the Volta Redonda steel complex in
Brazil, a step towards economic diversification and industrialisation, funded
by the Export-Import Bank’s public money after private companies refused.75
In terms of a post-interventionist strategy, the Good Neighbor policy
deserves recognition. This bounded transformationalism paid off for the
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Administration as Latin American states, with the effective exceptions of
Argentina and Chile, either declared war or broke relations with the Axis
Powers in the Second World War. Nevertheless, the effort to extend the New
Deal and forge a new approach to revolutionary nationalism was less suc-
cessful due to the limits of the proposals and institutions themselves, and the
blocking power of entrenched interests within the United States. In the case
of the Inter-American Bank, there is the tantalising possibility that the out-
come might have been different if the proposal had been more acceptable to
the Latin Americans but then, again, this might simply have increased
resistance amongst the bankers.76 In any case, as the war progressed, atten-
tion increasingly shifted towards Europe and, in 1945, America re-established
a right of (counter-) intervention against aggression through the 1945 multi-
lateral Act of Chapultepec and, subsequently, the 1947 Rio Pact as revolu-
tionary nationalism increasingly refracted through the prism of an
international communist threat.77
The ambition within Carter’s (1977–1981) foreign policy to move beyond
the ‘Cold war paradigm of containment’78 and make a ‘clear break from the
power politics of Nixon and Kissinger’ is widely acknowledged.79 Central to
this was an unwillingness to intervene militarily in the affairs of smaller
nations and to rejuvenate a sense of progressive moral purpose in international
affairs through the promotion of human rights and respect for the rights of
small nations. As Carter told an audience at the University of Notre Dame in
1977, ‘we have fought fire with fire, never thinking that fire is better quenched
with water’.80 Whilst during the first two years of his Administration Carter
had considerable success in redirecting American foreign policy towards
North-South issues, the thrust of foreign policy by the end of 1978 had reverted
to the Cold War struggle against the Soviet Union.
The Administration realised that the turn from interventionism alone would
not provide the necessary momentum to redefine the American role in the
world. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s national security advisor, stated, ‘if we do
not stand for something more than anticommunism, then indeed we may
confront the decline of the West’.81 Carter explained that as ‘we are not trying
to send in troops to make other nations conform to us’, the promotion of
‘human rights’ will enable ‘a President to exemplify … what the American
people believe’.82 Whilst human rights was the flagship policy, it was part of
a wider set of ‘world order’ themes designed for an increasingly complex and
multipolar world to be pursued alongside the continuation of détente. The
management of interdependence was foremost of these considerations, with
Brzezinksi andCarter bringing their experience from the Trilateral Commission,
a non-governmental policy-oriented forum, to deal with issues of trade, energy,
and conservation. So, too, was the rising profile of the global South following
decolonisation, the Vietnam war, and the rise of the Organisation of Petroleum
Exporting Countries’ political leverage, enabling Carter to stress the importance
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of respect for small nations not only as the right thing to do but also as
fundamental for America’s longer-term interests and security.
Carter was able to build upon the moral turn in Congress, and early
policies included the Panama Canal treaties, greater support for Black major-
ity rule in Africa – particularly in Rhodesia – normalising relations with
China, establishing peace between Egypt and Israel through the Camp David
Accords, and promoting human rights in Latin America.83 By late 1978
through 1979, however, Carter’s foreign policy took a distinct geopolitical
turn leading both to the proclamation of the ‘Carter Doctrine’, claiming the
right to intervene militarily to protect American interests in the Persian Gulf,
and limited covert funding of opposition movements in Afghanistan follow-
ing the Soviet invasion.84
A widely held yet contested perception was that détente had become a veil
behind which the Soviets – or their Cuban proxies – had consolidated if not
expanded their positions globally, notably in Ethiopia, Angola, Cuba with the
‘discovery’ of a Soviet brigade there, and, most significantly, Afghanistan after
the Moscow-directed invasion in 1979.85 In addition, the Islamist revolution in
Iran and socialist revolution in Nicaragua brought to power governments
highly sensitive to the legacies of American interventionism, exposed Carter
to criticism from the Right that he was failing to support allies, and left him
humiliated following the 1980 failure of the hostage-rescue mission to Teheran
to free American diplomatic captives. Worth noting, however, is that whilst the
marked, even exaggerated Cold War turn in Carter’s foreign policy was clear
enough, he still rejected intervention in Nicaragua even after losing confidence
in the Sandinistas’ commitment to democracy.86
Adverse international developments are not in and of themselves sufficient
to explain the failure of Carter’s transformationalist foreign policy during his
one term of office. Scholars have identified a range of factors including poor
leadership ability, the power of a reinvigorated and re-organised conservative
movement, the wider societal shift to the Right, intra-Administration divi-
sions, and the rising influence of the realist Brzezinski over the liberal
secretary of state, Cyrus Vance. There was also the unfavourable economic
environment, the abstract nature of the new tenets of foreign policy such as
human rights, and the failure to articulate a compelling post-New Deal vision
of American politics in the round.87 Where these points tend to converge is
on Carter’s limited domestic political support.
By the time of Carter’s election in 1976, conservatives were already turning
the liberal tide. For example, they twisted the issue of Congressional con-
straints on the president over Angola into one of loyalty and appeasement
rather than secrecy and accountability, chastening many Democrats to
become more cautious when they saw the possibility of electoral defeat.88
In Reagan as presidential candidate, conservatives had a gifted communicator
who appealed to a more militant strand of American nationalism,
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unapologetic about the use of American power, and deeply resentful of
liberal criticism of America and its role in the world. For this group,
Carter’s Panama Treaties touched a raw nerve and marked an important
point in the consolidation of the ‘New Right’ as a highly co-ordinated grass
roots movement that ‘reassert[ed] the primacy of the Cold War paradigm at
the precise moment that Carter was attempting to move beyond it’.89
At least as damaging as the intensification of partisanship, if not more so,
were the divisions amongst Democrats themselves. Carter did have
a majority in both houses, but this was ‘less potent than it seemed’.90
Carter was not of the established liberal-left and had little commitment to
Democratic ‘Great Society’ programmes or seeking to accommodate the
Party’s traditional support base in the labour unions. The decision of
Senator Edward Kennedy to run against Carter for the presidential nomina-
tion in 1980 epitomises this division, with the bitterness of the split evident
in Kennedy’s unwillingness to offer Carter an endorsement following his
defeat. As such, Carter’s transformationalism suffered from a disjuncture
between the nature and scale of his vision and the extent of his domestic
political support. His experience as a naval officer, in agri-business, and the
Trilateral Commission could not compensate for him being a political out-
sider in Washington politics and, in the absence of a strong working relation-
ship with the Congressional doyens of his own Party like Kennedy and
Representative Thomas O’Neill and the interests they represented,
a programme of transformational internationalism was unsustainable.
For the liberal transformationalists, the principled disavowal of interven-
tionism has been a necessary marker of credibility. But without perceived
success in effecting a wider transformation of American foreign relations
such a move can backfire and appear hollow, raising in turn the question of
whether this type of change is possible in the face of institutional and structural
constraints. At the very least, there is a need for unusually high levels of
political support at home and, as appropriate, relevant constituencies abroad.
It was remarked some 60 years ago that the United States ‘occasionally
indulge[s] in great bursts of intense aggressive egoism’ that are ‘usually
a source of self-recrimination, disillusionment, and apathy in the
aftermath’.91 Yet besides disillusionment, interventionism tends to leave
policy-makers with the same or expanded set of ‘problems’ that they initially
intervened to address. If intervention’s force majeure marks the failure of
politics and diplomacy, what is left when the intervention option itself is
proscribed? The answers to this question have given rise to some of the most
controversial and ambitious periods in American foreign relations. When
viewed beyond the lens of the ‘Vietnam’ or ‘Afghanistan syndromes’ to
encompass systematically the crises that followed the three major periods
of interventionism since the United States became a World Power, the
structural bases of the phenomenon becomes evident. Rooted in the nature
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of United States domestic politics, one finds the same ideological, constitu-
tional, and institutional factors that generate crises of interventionism paving
the contradictions of foreign policy after interventionism.
Evaluated in relation to the further use of force, Administration responses
may be analysed in terms of their respective order of change, comprising the
three main strategies. Each, however, is beset by a particular set of limits and
contradictions arising from the contested nature of American politics and the
ability of contesting groups to influence the policy-process through the many
leverage points afforded by American constitutional-institutional system.
Strategies of persistence have triggered high levels of domestic political
opposition, the intensity of which has varied principally according to the
perceived legitimacy and specific circumstances of particular operations.
Persistence in the use of force abroad tends to correlate with an assault on
democratic institutions and processes, running the risk of backfiring by
serving as a catalyst for the emergence of antithetical, transformationalist
approaches to the use of force. Ameliorism winds down a period of inter-
ventionism and, likely matched by fresh diplomatic initiatives, is vulnerable
to criticism on both flanks from persisters and transformationalists.
Transformationalism offers a more systematic reconceptualisation of the
nature of the foreign policy ‘problem’ and the appropriate response but
may lack the capacity to deliver, becoming vulnerable in turn to charges of
weakness or insincerity.
In the first of two further questions, do Republicans tend to be ‘persisters’
and Democrats ‘transformationalists’? Using great care, any such inference
simply cannot devolve from the limited pool of cases available. Whilst to date
all persisters would appear to have been Republicans, not all Republicans are
persisters. Moreover, whilst the two cases of transformationalim have both
been Democrats, it would be theoretically possible to conceive of
a conservative transformationalism under the auspices of, for example,
a libertarian foreign policy; but this would be a challenging political proposi-
tion. Ameliorism remains an option for both. Second, is the phenomenon and
respective pathways outlined above applicable only to the United States or to
democratic allies such as Britain and France? As the 2013 vote on Syria in the
British Parliament shows, the phenomenon is not restricted to the United
States. But precisely how extensive it is and how it is manifest would require
further research taking into account the colonial pasts of third states, their
political culture, and the specific character of their domestic political system.
Ultimately, ‘after interventionism’ marks the re-awakening of politics.
Therein, ‘bipartisanship is not the natural state of affairs in the conduct of
American foreign affairs’,92 which when combined with wider sets of political
and ideological differences pertaining to the interests and role of the United
States in the world make it difficult to sustain any of the approaches
discussed above. At the same time, however, better understanding of the
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recurring and structural nature of the problem may help address it. Indeed,
one of the points to emerge from identifying the range of responses pursued
during the three periods under discussion has been that the political and
ethical horizons of foreign policy are not fixed, and that crises of interven-
tionism can signal the opportunity for statecraft rather than its demise.
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